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Abstract 
Unions are an important indicator of various measures of firm performance in Anglo-
Saxon countries. The same holds for the German analogue of workplace unionism – 
the works council. Using the IAB Establishment Panel I examine the impact of works 
councils and shop-floor participation on further  training and training intensity. As 
some studies suggest that the impact of workplace representation varies with firm 
size, I also test for differences between large and small/medium-sized establish-
ments. Pooled logit and count data models are employed to analyze firms’ further 
training activity and training intensity. Because the treatment variables may suffer 
from endogeneity I also adopt linear and nonlinear instrumental variables tech-
niques. The analysis reveals a positive impact of works councils on firm-provided 




In angelsächsischen Ländern stellen Gewerkschaften einen bedeutsamen Indikator 
für verschiedene Kennzahlen der betrieblichen Leistungserstellung dar. Das gleiche 
gilt für die deutsche Form der betrieblichen Interessenvertretung – den Betriebsrat. 
Unter Verwendung des IAB-Betriebspanels  untersuche ich den Einfluss des Be-
triebsrats und anderen, informelleren Mitarbeitervertretungsformen auf die betriebli-
che Weiterbildungsaktivität und -intensität. Da aus der Literatur hervorgeht, dass der 
Einfluss der Mitbestimmung mit der Betriebsgröße variiert, prüfe ich weiter, ob damit 
Betriebsgrößendifferenziale verbunden sind.  Die Weiterbildungsaktivität bzw. -
intensität wird anhand von gepoolten Logit- und Zähldaten-Modellen analysiert. Da 
ein Endogenitätsproblem nicht auszuschließen ist, kommen ferner lineare wie nicht-
lineare Instrumentalvariablen-Ansätze zur Verwendung. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, 
dass der Betriebsrat einen positiven Einfluss auf die betriebliche Weiterbildung hat. 
Hinsichtlich der betriebsgrößenspezifischen Wirkung ist die Beweisdecke dünner. 
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1  Introduction 
The effects of German works councils (Betriebsrat) on a variety of aspects, produc-
tivity, employment growth and wages for instance, have received increasing atten-
tion in recent decades (see Addison et al. 2004 for an in-depth survey). Despite 
these advances the critique of Frege (2002) that effects of works councils on firm-
provided further training have been neglected so far still prevails, as most studies on 
training treat work councils rather incidentally. However, against the background of 
the increasing importance of lifelong learning and the qualification-unemployment 
link, vocational training is becoming increasingly relevant for workers. Recognizing 
the works council as an instrument to counterbalance the power of the employer and 
to raise the workers’ voice, it may promote firms’ training activities. This and similar 
arguments can be derived from the Exit-Voice Theory (Freeman & Medoff 1979). On 
the other hand, theoretical considerations suggest not only positive effects of works 
councils on firm-provided training. According to FitzRoy & Kraft (1985/1987), works 
councils may emerge in firms where the owner or manager is either unwilling or un-
able to consider employees’ interests properly. So it is far from certain what to ex-
pect.  
The focus of the present inquiry is therefore to evaluate the impact of works councils 
on firm-provided further training. However, workplace representation, that is inform-
ing, consulting and involving workers as regards the process and outcomes of man-
agement decision-making at the establishment or workplace level can also be as-
sured via other facilities. Shop-floor participation comprises more informal mecha-
nisms at the workplace level that are not set up on the basis of a law, such as em-
ployee spokesmen.  These more voluntary  or even management-driven  forms of 
workplace representation have been widely neglected so far and are also a subject 
of this study. As some literature (e.g. Green 1993) suggests that the impact of work-
place representation varies with firm size, large and small establishments are com-
pared. Finally, I provide evidence of the impact of works councils and shop-floor 
participation not only regarding the incidence of further training but also its intensity.  
This study adds to the literature a simultaneous analysis of effects of German works 
councils and shop-floor participation on firm-provided further training and gives an 
idea of the economic significance of this effect. Moreover it attempts to tackle issues 
of causation by deploying instrumental variable techniques, thereby corroborating 
existing simple cross-sectional results. To my knowledge this study is the first at-
tempt to test whether the effects of workplace representation on further training dif-
fer with firm size. The findings show considerable evidence in favour of a positive 
impact of workplace representation on firm-provided further training – at least with 
regard to works councils. Evidence on shop-floor participation also shows a remark-
able  positive  relationship,  whereas  findings on firm-size differentials are slightly 
weaker but altogether suggest that there is a stronger impact of workplace represen-
tation in smaller firms.  IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2010  5 
All in all this study suggests that policy makers should introduce more positive stim-
uli to enhance management-employee relations by mechanisms of workplace repre-
sentation if they wish to improve firms’ training efforts. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section lays out some theoretical con-
siderations and presents hypotheses. Section 3 briefly introduces the German works 
council, the mechanism of shop-floor participation and considers related training 
literature. Section 4 introduces the IAB Establishment Panel and discusses my key 
variables. Section 5 deals with the empirical strategy and Section 6 presents the 
findings. A summary concludes. 
2  Theoretical Backdrop 
The Works Constitution Act (WCA, Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) equips works coun-
cils with various rights (see next section). Among other things, works councils may 
initiate checks of further training needs and participate in the organization of further 
training measures. So it is reasonable to attribute a direct training effect to works 
councils. However, it is not clear whether these changes should lead to more train-
ing, as intended, since firms may also reduce their training effort due to fears of new 
conflicts with the works council. So it is necessary to look at more indirect effects of 
works councils on firm-provided further training. 
Classical human capital theory (Becker 1962) still provides a sound basis to reflect 
on the effects of workplace representation on a firm’s training activity. The essential 
idea of human capital theory is that the decision to train can be seen as a decision 
to invest. An important property of the investment process is that it takes time for 
returns on investment to emerge. Meanwhile, several problems may occur which 
inhibit or reduce the expected returns. I therefore use the three potential training 
barriers  listed below to evaluate the  Exit-Voice Theory  and the Managerial (In-
)Competence Hypothesis with regard to training. This provides a way of explaining 
the effects of workplace representation on training, although the theoretical ap-
proaches do not necessarily offer direct access to training issues.  
1) According to Hashimoto (1995) there are informational asymmetries between the 
trained worker and the training firm regarding the external and internal productivity 
of the trained worker. This informational problem leads to inefficient  separations 
which reduce investments in human capital as they lower the expected returns from 
training. As workplace representation increases the information flow between em-
ployer and employees,  these informational asymmetries are  reduced (Rogers & 
Streeck 1994). Therefore better channels of communication between employers and 
employees should boost training activities.  
2) Every investment process is endangered – including the training investment – if 
one party can capture parts or all of the other party’s returns. Smith (1991) empha-
sizes this hold-up problem and concludes that there is a great deal of leeway for 
opportunistic behaviour, especially on the part of employers, and emphasizes the IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2010  6 
need for some form of process protection for investments in human  capital. As 
works councils (and to some degree other forms of employee representation) em-
power the employees to reduce such opportunistic behaviour, there should be more 
training. 
3) Besides the classical distinction between  specific and general human capital, 
human capital is known to be at least partly transferable. Therefore the workers’ 
increased productivity is of some value not only within the training firm but also out-
side the firm, thus creating an incentive for outside firms to poach trained workers 
(Stevens 1996). Because works councils are known to reduce labour turnover (Frick 
& Möller 2003, Hirsch et al. 2009), they should also stimulate firms’ training efforts. 
Again given that there are functional alternatives to works councils, the same should 
hold for shop-floor participation. 
So far these are only some hints regarding the effects of workplace representation 
on firm-provided training. But these potential training barriers (inefficient separa-
tions, hold-ups and poaching) will now be linked to two established theories of work-
place representation. This provides a way to discuss the effects of workplace repre-
sentation on firm-provided further  training  in-depth  and more systematically, al-
though there is no obvious or direct impact channel. 
The Managerial (In)Competence Hypothesis 
The Managerial Incompetence Hypothesis (FitzRoy & Kraft 1985/1987) argues that 
works councils emerge in firms where the owner or manager is either unwilling or 
unable to consider employees’ interests properly. The introduction of a works coun-
cil serves as an instrument to force the employer to communicate and to respect the 
employees’ needs. In addition, as the autocratic managers’ incapability yields ineffi-
ciencies, works councils should emerge as a reaction to a (conceivable) crisis. On 
the other hand, the Managerial Competence Hypothesis refers to the most compe-
tent managers, who devote a lot of time to employees’ interests. These employers 
typically establish mechanisms of employee representation to maintain or enhance 
the employer-employee relations without imposing formal institutions. This therefore 
helps to explain the existence of shop-floor participation in such firms. Furthermore, 
in contrast to the Managerial  Competence Hypothesis, the Managerial  Incompe-
tence Hypothesis is not suitable for explaining more informal forms of representation 
like shop-floor participation as they are not enforceable by employees. 
Regarding the potential problems of human capital investment introduced above, 
one can expect works councils – imposed by employees – to be found in firms with 
more inefficient separations, due to the insufficient communication. Because of their 
potential inefficiencies, these firms will also pay lower wages and therefore boost 
possible hold-up problems. Concerning the poaching phenomenon, the arguments 
are ambiguous, because unhappy employees are more likely to leave the firm than 
employees of competent managers. Therefore the existence of a works council is IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2010  7 
related to a lower training effort of the firm. On the other hand, outside firms could 
interpret a firm’s poor performance as a signal of low productivity among its employ-
ees, which should lead to less poaching. The opposite propositions hold in the case 
of shop-floor participation introduced by competent managers (see also table 1). So 
shop-floor participation should have a positive effect on firm-provided training. 
Exit-Voice Theory 
The Exit-Voice Theory (Freeman & Medoff 1979) is one of the most prominent ex-
planations of unionism that can easily be extended to works councils. This theory 
starts out from the consideration that there are two basic mechanisms in society 
which make it possible to cope with divergences between actual and desired social 
conditions. The first mechanism is the market mechanism (exit/entry). On the one 
hand the dissatisfied employee quits his job or the unhappy couple divorces, while 
on the other hand there will be new matches. A second mechanism refers to Albert 
Hirschman’s “Voice” (Hirschman 1970). This means that parties talk about the di-
verging conditions and about their problems and try to find a solution by means of 
bargaining and discussion. So the dissatisfied employee complains and the unhappy 
couple tries to solve its problems. Effective voice is characterized by collective 
rather than individual action, because most goods in the context of industrial rela-
tions are public goods. Additionally some employees will refuse to reveal their true 
preferences due to the fact that exit is not a real option. Both unions and works 
councils (and to some extent other forms of workplace representation) are thus 
voice-institutions that allow problems regarding public goods to be solved in the con-
text of industrial relations. Moreover, the appropriateness of works councils to serve 
as a voice-institution and to ensure bottom-up communication arises not only from 
their special rights, which are protected by law, but also because they can be used 
as an effective channel for top-down communication. This last fact holds especially 
for shop-floor participation. 
Regarding again the three potential problems of investment in human capital, it can 
be argued that works councils reduce the costs of communication or even make 
trustful communication  possible in the first place, thereby decreasing inefficient 
separations. Furthermore, the survival of the firm can be regarded as an important 
public good which is threatened by opportunistic action. So it is reasonable to sup-
pose that works councils or other forms of employee representation should make an 
effort to avoid hold-up problems. Finally, poaching ought to be reduced as well, be-
cause voice is an alternative to exit by definition. Altogether these considerations 
suggest a positive effect of works councils and shop floor participation on a firms’ 
training effort. 
Hypotheses 
The theoretical approaches introduced contradict each other at least partially and 
lead to conflicting hypotheses regarding human capital investment. Table 1 sums up 
the relations described above. IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2010  8 
Table 1 
Workplace representation and potential training barriers 
  Ineff. separations  Hold-up  Poaching 
Managerial Incompetence Hypothesis
a  +  +  +/- 
Managerial Competence Hypothesis
b  -  -  +/- 
Exit-Voice Theory  -  -  - 
Example: The theoretical approaches suggest that firms with workplace representation will face more 
(+) or fewer (-) potential problems regarding the human capital investment; 
a refers only to works coun-
cil, 
b refers only to shop-floor participation. 
Hence, there are conflicting propositions regarding the effect of works councils’ on 
training, because the Managerial Incompetence Hypothesis suggests more ineffi-
cient separations and hold-up problems, whereas the Exit-Voice Theory argues that 
these problems should be reduced. For this reason I formulate three hypotheses, 
two of which conflict: 
Hypothesis 1a: The existence of a works council leads to a higher training probabil-
ity and intensity. 
Hypothesis 1b: The existence of a works council is related to a lower training prob-
ability and intensity. 
Hypothesis 2: The existence of shop-floor participation leads to a higher training 
probability and intensity. 
It should be emphasized that,  strictly speaking,  hypothesis 1b –  which is based 
solely on the Managerial (In)Competence Hypothesis – only makes it possible to 
predict a relationship because the works council is a result of the inefficiency but 
does not trigger it. This is also necessary if both hypotheses (1a and 1b) should be 
simultaneously true. Actually some of my empirical results provide evidence for both 
hypotheses (see discussion of the bivariate probit model in section 6). 
Concerning the firm-size-specific effects of workplace representation, the existing 
literature arrives at different conclusions. On the one hand, Green (1993) points out 
that effects of workplace representation should have most impact where there is an 
absence of other pressures to train. This holds especially for a lot of small firms as 
they often use less modern technologies or make fewer investments for example. 
Therefore a larger firm can be expected to be influenced to a lesser extent. On the 
other hand, Addison et al. (2000) argue – at least regarding the works council – that 
as the WCA provides the works councils of larger firms with more rights, the effects 
of works councils should be greatest in larger firms. So once again, conflicting hy-
potheses (concerning works councils) are inevitable: 
Hypothesis 3a: Works councils have most impact in small and medium-sized firms. 
Hypothesis 3b: Works councils have most impact in large firms. 
Hypothesis 4: Mechanisms of shop-floor participation have most impact in small 
and medium-sized firms. IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2010  9 
As the Managerial (In)Competence Hypothesis allows no causal statements regard-
ing the analyzed training barriers but the firm-size-specific considerations require a 
causal relationship between training and workplace representation, hypotheses 3a/b 
and 4 are based only on the Exit-Voice Theory. 
3  Workplace Representation in Germany and Previous  
Literature 
The rights and responsibilities of the works council are determined by the Works 
Constitution Act (WCA), which became effective in 1952. Amendments were made 
in 1972 and in 2001. A works council consists of workers who are elected for a pe-
riod of four years and they can be set up in establishments with at least five workers, 
three of whom must be eligible for election. Since the employees alone can decide 
whether or not they wish to elect a works council, formation is not automatic. The 
rights of the works council, which increase with the size of the firm, comprise infor-
mation rights, consultation rights, veto rights and co-determination rights and pro-
vide the basis for representing the employees’ interests regarding labour (protection) 
laws. The works councils’ sphere of action covers for example working conditions 
(e.g. working time, overtime), remuneration (e.g. payment schemes, performance-
related remuneration) and personnel affairs (e.g. hirings, layoffs, employment pro-
tection).
 1
Moreover, the reform of the WCA in 2001 strengthened the influence of the works 
council in matters of training. The works council may initiate checks regarding the 
need for training (WCA §96) and co-determine further training measures (WCA 
§97). This holds especially with respect to employees whose qualifications are likely 
to become obsolete. It is also worth noting that these new training rights are irre-
spective of firm size. Other important changes under the 2001 reform of the WCA 
were: simplified voting procedure, reduced employment thresholds to determine the 
number of councillors, more influence regarding employment protection and addi-
tional entitlements concerning the internal organization of the works council. For an 
in-depth review of the 2001 reform see Addison et al. 2004.  
  
However, besides the works council, the participation of employees can also be as-
sured via shop-floor participation (Ellguth 2009). But in contrast to works councils, 
mechanisms of shop-floor participation have no legal basis and lack a common defi-
nition. These forms of participation may exist alternatively or simultaneously to 
works councils and are typically less stable. Examples are employee spokesmen, 
employee councils or committees and similar forms of communication mechanisms 
between management and employees. In contrast to works councils, shop-floor par-
ticipation is also more often induced by the management, meaning that these forms 
of representation have clearly less potential to strengthen the position of employees 
in times of conflict.  
The Anglo-Saxon analogue of the German works councils is workplace unionism. It 
is therefore worth starting the review of literature with union effects on training. IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2010  10 
These findings are particularly interesting, because theoretical explanations (e.g. 
Freemann & Medoff 1979) of collective action can be adopted regarding both phe-
nomena. Whereas Mincer (1983) concludes from a theoretical point of view that 
unions should strengthen firms’ training activities, his empirical findings rather sug-
gest a negative effect. Green (1993) builds on this analysis and exploits the UK La-
bour Force Survey. His results show a positive effect of union membership on the 
training probability, but only in small firms. He arrives at the conclusion that “[…] any 
union is likely to have the most impact where there is an absence of other pressures 
to train. For this reason, the larger firm […] may be less influenced by unions in this 
respect than the smaller firm” (Green 1993: 1035). Furthermore, Booth et al. (2003) 
find a positive effect of individual union membership on the training probability and 
the duration of the training measures. On the other hand, Addison and Belfield 
(2008), who examine training incidence, intensity and duration, find no significant 
effects of unions apart from the duration of the measures. 
The results of previous research often state a positive relationship between training 
and works councils in Germany. For instance, Gerlach and Jirjahn (2001) report a 
positive relationship between works councils and the firms’ decisions to finance 
training and the amount spent on training. Some studies using the IAB Establish-
ment Panel report no significant effect of works councils on training intensity (Zwick 
2004), but a positive effect on training incidence (Zwick 2005). Bellmann and Ellguth 
(2006) implement a matching technique to exploit the 2001 WCA reform and con-
clude that firms with a works council have a higher level of training activity and – 
contrary to Zwick (2004) – training intensity. Yet they find no statistically significant 
effects regarding the WCA reform. Finally, Bellmann and Leber (2006) decompose 
the training differences between large and small firms and find that half of the differ-
ence explained by firm characteristics is due to the works council, thereby empha-
sizing the significance of this institution. While there are some findings on works 
councils and training, results on determinants of shop-floor participation in Germany 
are quite scarce. Ellguth (2009) explores the effects of the introduction of shop-floor 
participation on a set of personnel activities of firms. Aside from a less smaller train-
ing intensity after the introduction of shop-floor participation he identifies no signifi-
cant effects. He also points out that the closure of a works council is a crucial pre-
condition for the introduction of shop-floor participation itself, while the permanent 
existence of a works council has no significant effect. On the other hand, the aban-
donment of shop-floor participation raises the probability of a works councils’ being 
introduced. So the two forms of workplace representation are substitutes to some 
extent. 
4  Data and Variables 
This study uses the German IAB
2 Establishment Panel, an annual survey of approx. 
16,000 establishments representing all industries and establishment sizes. The sur-
vey is based on a stratified sample from the population of all German establish-
ments with at least one employee liable to social security (as of 30 June of the pre-IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2010  11 
vious year). The data are collected in personal interviews with the owners or man-
agers. To correct for panel mortality and to reflect the foundation of new establish-
ments the sample is augmented every year. As the Establishment Panel is created 
to serve the needs of the German Federal Employment Agency, it focuses on em-
ployment-related matters. Nonetheless it covers a large range of topics. In-depth 
information can be found in Fischer et al. (2009). 
This inquiry uses information on the years 2003 to 2007 since the information on 
shop-floor participation has only been collected since 2003. I excluded establish-
ments in the non-profit sector as well as those with fewer than five employees, be-
cause the WCA does not allow works councils in establishments with fewer employ-
ees.  
Information on training is collected every second year up to 2007.
3 The opening 
question asks if the establishment promoted further training in the first half of the 
year (reference date of the survey is 30 June) by releasing employees from work 
and/or meeting the costs entirely or in part. The variable “training activity” is there-
fore a dummy (1 = firm provides training). To analyze “training intensity” I use the 
number of workers trained during the first half of the year.
4  Depending on the 
econometric model (see next section), I employ the number or the fraction of work-
ers trained as a proportion of all employees. Regarding workplace representation 
the data contain two more dummies, one for works council (1 = existence of a works 
council as of 30 June) and one for shop-floor participation (1 = existence of shop-
floor participation as of 30 June). As the information on workplace representation 
refers to 30 June but training to the first half of the year, I employ the representation 
status of the previous year. This additionally takes into account the commonplace 
that any impact should occur after the treatment.  
Beyond the mere existence of works councils and shop-floor participation I also in-
vestigate the introduction of these institutions. The hypotheses therefore cover the 
introduction as well although this was not mentioned explicitly. I thus constructed a 
set of dummy variables in order to measure whether a) the works council/shop-floor 
participation was introduced or closed during the previous two years or whether b) 
there was always or never a works council/shop-floor participation during this period. 
Table A1 (appendix) summarizes the procedure. 
Considering firm size I compare small and medium-sized establishments (SMEs) 
with large establishments. An establishment is an SME if it has at least five but not 
more than 249 employees. Establishments with more than 249 employees are con-
sidered large establishments. Furthermore, establishments with at least five em-
ployees which are not a single firm entity are also regarded as large establishments, 
as the data contain no information on the size of the firm. This definition is based 
upon the legal definition which is often important regarding public-funded measures 
for SMEs in the European Union. It should be stressed that my empirical findings 
are robust with respect to the single-firm criterion. IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2010  12 
Table 2 







  Works council  Shop-floor part.  Works council  Shop-floor part. 
All establishments  31.5  8.8  2.4  5.8 
SMEs  15.5  8.2  1.5  5.4 
Large establishments  65.1  10.2  4.6  6.7 
SMEs
 = small and medium-sized establishments; 
a refers to logit model I (table 5) 
b refers to logit 
model II (table 7). Source: IAB Establishment Panel (2003-2007). 
As is shown in Table 2, works councils are more common than shop-floor participa-
tion. Around one third of all observations have a works council, whereas only nine 
percent exhibit shop-floor participation. The findings show that works councils are a 
function of firm size. Throughout, one has to emphasize the rather scarce occasions 
of works councils or shop-floor participation being introduced. 
Beyond these key variables I control for a range of firm characteristics that are typi-
cally deployed in training models (e.g. Gerlach & Jirjahn 2001; Lynch & Black 1998; 
Neubäumer et al. 2006): A larger proportion of part-time workers and of fixed-term 
contract workers should reduce further training activities, as they shorten the period 
of returns; similar arguments hold for higher labour turnover. It is common knowl-
edge that a larger share of skilled workers is associated with a stronger further train-
ing activity. Equipment and investment in a firms’ equipment (technology of equip-
ment, IT investment, investment in the production facility or equipment) often induce 
a need for further training. Collective agreements lead to a compressed wage struc-
ture encouraging employers to invest more in human capital as they have to share 
returns only partially with trained employees. Moreover, the estimations control for 
the type of establishment (single establishment or firm), the firm’s profitability in the 
previous year, region (eastern/western Germany), dummies for industries and firm 
size (see appendix table A2 for more information on these variables). 
5  Econometric Strategy 
I estimate pooled logit models to analyze further training activity, while training in-
tensity is estimated by applying pooled zero-inflated-negative-binomial models 
(ZINB) (Hardin & Hilbe 2007). The ZINB model makes it possible not only to model 
the number of workers trained (count coefficient) but also to consider the inverse 
training probability of the establishment (inflate coefficient). This takes into account 
the fact that some establishments fail to train by coincidence while others are sys-
tematically inactive, although the data themselves cannot distinguish between the 
two types. By including the logarithm of the number of employees as a regressor 
with a coefficient restricted to one, the dependent variable can be interpreted as a 
proportion (see appendix for more information). To justify the usage of the ZINB 
model I employ a likelihood-ratio test to decide whether the assumption of equidis-
persion (mean equals the variance) of the zero-inflated-poisson model (ZIP) is vio-
lated (Hilbe 2007) and a Vuong test to check whether there is indeed an excess 
zeros problem (Greene 1994). If there are no excess zeros the negative-binomial 
model (NB) would be more suitable. IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2010  13 
Because raw coefficients are difficult to interpret, I estimate marginal effects (strictly 
speaking I calculate discrete changes, as my regressors are dummies) for the aver-
age establishment  , as well. This makes it possible to assess the 
size of the effect in nonlinear models. In order to test for firm-size differentials, mar-
ginal effects are compared similar to Weesies (1999) procedure. The hypothesis is  
 
where   denotes the c.d.f. of the logistic distribution in the case of the logit model 
(and the c.d.f. of the normal distribution in the case of the probit model).   is the co-
efficient of works council and shop-floor participation respectively. The subscripts   




The test statistic and its significance are to be found in the last rows of the regres-
sion tables. Because the models are applied to pooled data I have to allow for corre-
lation within establishments. This is done by clustering the standard errors and ap-
plying a modification of Whites (1980) sandwich-estimator. 
So far it should be borne in mind that the results could suffer from unobserved het-
erogeneity. Especially regarding the works council, existing literature (e.g. Addison 
et al. 2006, Mueller 2009) emphasizes that endogeneity might be a problem. Firms 
with a high level of further training activity or intensity could differ from establish-
ments with low levels in an unobserved way that is also related to a higher probabil-
ity of having a works council. For example, such establishments might have a spe-
cial management emphasizing employees’ needs and participation. Another bias 
could result from the fact that works councils are introduced in times of poor per-
formance (Jirjahn 2009), thus related to a lower level of training activity. In more 
econometric terms: the estimated coefficients are potentially biased (omitted vari-
able bias) because  . I therefore checked different strategies for dealing 
with unobserved factors. First, I estimated various fixed-effects models. This strat-
egy would control for unobserved time-constant effects. But as the data cover only a 
short period and there is only a small within-variation regarding workplace represen-
tation, the coefficients are insignificant and the models did not converge. 
Another way to deal with unobserved heterogeneity is to use an observable variable 
 that satisfies the assumption   and  . If there is such an instru-
mental variable (IV) for   it is possible to use an IV estimator. Beyond the fixed-
effects models mentioned above, this strategy even solves the problem of time-
varying unobserved variables. I thus estimated bivariate probit models and linear IV 
models
5  (Evans  &  Schwab 1995; Wooldridge 2002).  As an instrument I use a 
dummy variable indicating whether or not the establishment was founded before IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2010  14 
1990. As I have only one instrument my model is just identified. To check the validity 
of the instrument I document the correlation of works council and the age dummy 
(shorthand in tables: IV correlation), I include the age dummy jointly with all exoge-
nous variables in a probit model explaining the works council (shorthand: IV coeffi-
cient) and I examine whether the related F statistic is larger than the critical rule-of-
thumb value of 10 (Cameron & Trivedi 2009).  
Unfortunately I only have an instrument for works council and I cannot extend this 
approach to shop-floor participation. As I suppose that shop-floor participation suf-
fers from the same endogeneity problem, all results should be biased if shop-floor 
participation is included. Excluding shop-floor participation from the estimations, 
however, results in an omitted variable bias as well. I therefore ran both versions 
and found only small differences, none of which were substantial regarding my hy-
potheses. The presented results rely on estimations without shop-floor participation. 
6  Empirical Findings  
Descriptive Evidence 
Table 3 shows some prima facie evidence on the relationship between workplace 
representation and further training. Across all groups, there is a larger proportion of 
training firms in the presence of workplace representation. The same holds for the 
proportion of workers  trained,  though  the differences are smaller. Regarding the 
proportion of establishments providing  training, this gap is found to be larger in 
SMEs than in large establishments. This finding holds again for training intensity, but 
only with regard to shop-floor participation. So far, there is descriptive evidence in 
favor of hypotheses 1a and 2, which is a positive relation between further training 
and workplace representation. Furthermore, some evidence is gained in favor of 
hypothesis 4 and parts of hypothesis 3a. 
Table 3 
Proportion of establishments providing training / proportion of workers trained 






  Woco  No woco  Sfp  No sfp  woco  No woco  Sfp  No sfp 
All e.  89.4  59.6  79.1  68.0  25.1  20.9  25.6  21.9 
SMEs  82.2  56.5  72.2  59.4  20.6  20.0  24.4  19.7 
Large e.  93.0  75.5  90.5  86.5  27.4  25.9  27.7  26.8 
SMEs
 = small and medium-sized establishments; 
a observations of logit model I, 
b observations of 
ZINB model I; woco = works council, sfp = shop-floor participation, e. = establishments. Source: IAB 
Establishment Panel (2003-2007). 
The findings in Table 4 refer to the introduction of a works council and shop-floor 
participation respectively. The first part presents evidence on the proportion of es-
tablishments  providing  further  training and the second part  on the proportion of 
workers trained by comparing the training measures of establishments introducing 
such  a  mechanism of representation  with establishments that never had such 
mechanisms.  The description reveals that establishments introducing workplace 
representation usually have a higher level of further training activity and intensity IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2010  15 
than establishments which never had such mechanisms. Thus, there is support for 
hypothesis 1a and hypothesis 2. The findings for firm-size differentials suggest that 
the difference in further training activity and intensity between firms that introduce 
shop-floor participation and firms that do not do so, is larger for SMEs (hypothesis 
4). As for works councils, there is only a small difference that supports hypothesis 
3a regarding the training intensity.  
Table 4 
Proportion of establishments providing training / proportion of workers trained in establishments with 
introduction of /without workplace representation 
  Training activity
a 
(N=12.042) 
  All establishments  SMEs  Large est‘s 
Introduction of works councils  73.8  68.5  77.8 
Without works councils  58.3  55.4  75.8 
Introduction of shop-floor part.  80.4  73.7  92.7 
Without shop-floor part.  66.2  57.7  86.4 
  Training intensity
b 
(N=11.910) 
  All establishments  SMEs  Large est‘s 
Introduction of works councils  25.1  22.1  27.4 
Without works councils  20.6  19.7  26.0 
Introduction of shop-floor part.  27.6  26.4  29.9 
Without shop-floor part.  21.5  19.3  26.8 
SMEs
 = small and medium-sized establishments; 
a observations of logit model II, 
b observations of 
ZINB model II. Source: IAB Establishment Panel (2003-2007). 
 
Econometric Analysis 
All of the tables show the coefficients and standard errors considered. Regarding 
training intensity I focus on the count coefficients of the ZINB models. Inflation coef-
ficients are presented for completeness only. Marginal effects are reported for small 
and large establishments. The significance of their difference is shown in the last 
row (test). To judge the relevance of the effects the training probability and intensity 
of the average firm is also given (ref. point). Depending on the model other test sta-
tistics are also presented. Table 5 outlines the results of the logit model (see appen-
dix table A2 for description) regarding the firms’ further training activity. Throughout 
all of the models, there are positive significant coefficients for works councils and 
shop-floor participation, indicating an increased training probability in firms with 
workplace representation. The marginal effect of shop-floor participation among 
SMEs, indicating an increase in the training probability of about ten percentage 
points, is about four times larger than among large establishments. The test statistic 
(see last row) denotes a significant difference. Although the marginal effect of works 
councils is larger among SMEs as well, the difference is not significant. Moreover, 
Table 6 shows the findings on training intensity (see appendix table A2 for descrip-
tion). First the likelihood-ratio test of the dispersion parameter alpha suggests that 
the Poisson assumption of equidispersion does not hold (therefore ZINB > ZIP) and IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2010  16 
the Vuong test prefers the ZINB model as there is indeed an excess zeros problem 
(therefore ZINB > NB).  
Table 5 
Logit model I 
Dependent variable: training activity 









 (Std. E.) 
Marginal 






(0.0962)  0.106***  0.459** 






(0.0993)  0.0677***  0.482*** 
(0.127)  0.335***  2.37 
Ref. point      0.635    0.930   
Observations  15,113  10,229  4,884   
Pseudo-R
2  0.2324  0.1735  0.2228   
SMEs = small and medium-sized establishments; controls as reported in section 4, for full results see 
appendix A3; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: IAB Es-
tablishment Panel (2003-2007). 
 
Table 6 
Zero inflated negative binomial model I 
Dependent variable: number of workers trained 
  All estab’s  SMEs  Large establishments   







 (Std. E.) 
Marginal 
Effect  Test 







0.0206  3.13* 













0.0184***  0.63 






Ref. point      0.196    0.275   
LR test  3.5e+05***  4.0e+04***  3.1e+05***   
Vuong test  23.50***  20.61***  9.76***   
Observations  14,909  10,178  4,713   
Wald-   896.00  615.34  460.62   
Woco = works council, sfp = shop-floor participation, SMEs = small and medium-sized establish-
ments; LR test = Likelihood-ratio test; controls as reported in section 4, for full results see appendix 
A4; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: IAB Establishment 
Panel (2003-2007). 
 
The results regarding the introduction of a works council or shop-floor participation 
(tables 7 and 8) are estimated with firms that always have such forms of workplace 
representation as the reference group. Again the Poisson assumption of equidisper-
sion does not hold and the Vuong test prefers the ZINB model. In most of the esti-
mations the results indicate a positive significant effect of shop-floor participation on 
both training activity and intensity. There is also evidence of the expected difference IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2010  17 
between large establishments and SMEs, but only as regards training activity: the 
estimated training probability grows by only four percentage points in large estab-
lishments but by fourteen percentage points in SMEs after introducing shop-floor 
participation. However, regarding the introduction of works councils, there are no 
significant coefficients concerning either training activity or training intensity. Only 
establishments which have works councils all the time again show a significant posi-
tive coefficient (see appendix table A5). 
Table 7 
Logit model II 
Dependent variable: training activity 
  All estab’s  SMEs  Large establishments   
















(0.130)  0.138***  0.912*** 







(0.218)  -0.048  -0.0308 
(0.238)  0.002  0.69 
Ref. point      0.624    0.929   
Observations  12,042  8.377  3.665   
Pseudo-R
2  0.2340  0.1753  0.2268   
Woco = works council, sfp = shop-floor participation, SMEs = small and medium-sized establishments; 
a reference group = never works council, 
b reference group = never shop-floor participation; controls as 
reported in section 4, for full results see appendix A5; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: IAB Establishment Panel (2003-2007). 
 
The results of the logit and ZINB models regarding the existence and introduction of 
workplace representation provide some support for hypothesis 1a and strong sup-
port for hypothesis 2. So altogether this suggests rather positive effects of workplace 
representation on further training, particularly for shop-floor participation. However, 
findings on the difference between large and small establishments reveal support for 
hypothesis 4 only. There is no systematic difference regarding works councils. 
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Table 8 
Zero inflated negative binomial model II 
Dependent variable: number of workers trained 
  All estab’s  SMEs  Large establishments   


















































Ref. point      0.193    0.279   
LR test  2.6e+05***  3.1e+04***  2.2e+05***   
Vuong test  21.56***  18.92***  8.74***   
Observations  11,910  8,343  3,567   
Wald-   790.62  540.61  403.69   
Woco = works council, sfp = shop-floor participation, SMEs = small and medium-sized establishments; 
LR test = Likelihood-ratio test; 
a reference group = never works council, 
b reference group = never 
shop-floor participation; controls as reported in section 4, for full results see appendix A6; robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: IAB Establishment Panel (2003-
2007). 
The results of the bivariate probit model can be found in table 9. Here, rho makes it 
possible to decide whether the instrumented or the uncorrected results should be 
preferred. Throughout, both the IV coefficients and the marginal effects are larger 
than the uncorrected coefficients and marginal effects. As they are positively signifi-
cant, this confirms the findings of the logit model I – the marginal effects are even 
larger and indicate an increase in the training probability of roughly 18 percentage 
points among SMEs. Regarding large establishments I find an insignificant rho. So 
there should be no endogeneity problem. This is reflected in rather similar coeffi-
cients and marginal effects regarding the instrumented and not instrumented results. 
In contrast to the uncorrected results (logit model I), the difference between large 
establishments and SMEs is now significant, suggesting that works councils should 
have a stronger impact (of about 13 percentage points) on training activity in SMEs.  
It is worth mentioning that rho not only makes it possible to decide on the endogene-
ity problem, but also provides information about the correlation of the error terms, 
that is all unobserved characteristics. As I find a negative rho, there should also be a 
negative relationship between the existence of a works council and firm-provided 
further training (at least for SMEs). This finding supports the Managerial Incompe-
tence Hypothesis according to which works councils emerge as a reaction to a (con-
ceivable) crisis. So indeed, both hypotheses 1a and 1b gain support as there is a 
positive direct effect of works councils on and an indirect negative relationship with 
further training. So the two hypotheses do not really conflict but rather show opposi-
tional effects (or relations), which also helps to explain why there is an even larger 
effect in the bivariate probit model than in the simple logit model. IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2010  19 
Regarding the quality of the instrument I use here, there is literature on works coun-
cils which suggests that the age of an establishment is an important predictor of the 
existence of works councils. Addison et al. (2009), for example, argue that age is 
important because of the very persistence of bargaining structures. Or the other way 
around: younger firms may need more flexible institutions. Apart from this argument, 
I document the correlation of works council and the age dummy (IV correlation), 
which is between 0.11 and 0.23. Furthermore, a probit model (including various con-
trols) explaining the works council reveals a statistically significant coefficient for the 
instrument (IV coefficient). Moreover, regarding the linear IV estimator, the F statistic 
is larger than the critical rule-of-thumb value of 10 (Cameron & Trivedi 2009). 
Table 9 
Bivariate probit model 
Dependent variable: training activity 
  All estab’s  SMEs  Large establishments   















(0.112)  0.182***  0.305* 






(0.0461)  0.052***  0.268*** 
(0.0568)  0.0412***  2.36 
Ref. point      0.621    0.928   
Obervations  20,547  13,745  6,802       
Wald-   8107.15  4401.39  2334.26   
Rho  -0.179***  -0.229***  -0.0470   
IV correlation  0.18***  0.10***  0.22***   
IV coefficient  0.14***  0.143***  0.165***   
Woco = works council, SMEs = small and medium-sized establishments; controls as reported in sec-
tion 4, instrument = founding-year before/after 1990; for full results see appendix A7; robust standard 
errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: IAB Establishment Panel (2003-2007). 
 
The results of the linear IV estimation are somewhat uncomfortable (table 10). First, 
it can be noted that there are again positive significant effects to be found. So, due 
to the presence of works councils, not only the probability of training but also the 
training intensity is larger. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) statistic (Cameron  & 
Trivedi 2009) leads to a  reasonable rejection of the hypothesis that the variable 
works council is exogenous for the overall case. Regarding the SMEs I can reject 
this hypothesis only at the 0.1 level, whereas for large establishments this test even 
suggests preferring the uncorrected results. Again, in the latter case the coefficients 
are quite similar compared to the uncorrected model. So considering the firm-size 
differentials I find a slightly larger coefficient for the SMEs – but only in the IV case, 
the uncorrected coefficient is smaller. Regarding the 0.1 level of the DWH statistic 
again this finding is slightly problematic. But even if I prefer the IV estimations (for 
SMEs) and compare them with the uncorrected coefficient (for large establish-
ments), the test does not work within the linear IV framework. Besides, the two coef-
ficients do not differ so considerably, suggesting only a small, unsystematic differ-
ence. Altogether these results corroborate hypothesis 1a, thus suggesting that there 
is indeed a positive impact of works councils on further training activity and intensity. IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2010  20 
Regarding the firm-size differentials the IV estimations, unlike the logit estimations, 
shed new light on hypothesis 3a and provide evidence that works councils have a 
stronger impact on further training activity but not on its intensity in SMEs. 
 
Table 10 
Linear instrumental variable model 
Dependent variable: training intensity 
  All estab’s  SMEs  Large estab’s   





(Std. E.)  Test 





(0.0506)  a 
 
Woco not in-





(0.00978)  10.90*** 
 
Observations  21,363  14,391  6,972   
DWH statistic  4.950**  3.593*  0.0717   
F statistic  18.45***  39.40***  11.11***   
R
2  0.1303  0.1327  0.1141   
IV correlation  0.18***  0.10***  0.23***   
IV coefficient  0.0189***  0.0123*  0.0410***   
Woco = works council, SMEs = small and medium-sized establishments; DWH = Durbin-Wu-Hausman; 
a = test not feasible; controls as reported in section 4, instrument = founding-year before/after 1990; for 
full results see appendix A8; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel (2003-2007). 
 
7  Conclusions  
Typically, discussion of the economic effects of workplace representation comprises 
various aspects such as productivity, profitability, employment growth and wages. 
There are also numerous empirical studies that deal with these topics and try to 
measure these effects or relations. But to date there are only few studies that try to 
evaluate the effects of workplace representation on training. One reason might be 
that the effects on training are not (all) obvious at first sight but are more indirect. 
Regarding the German experience it is also noteworthy that the mere enrichment of 
works councils’ rights regarding training (direct effect) does not have positive effects, 
or only to a small extent (Bellmann & Ellguth 2006). It should also be mentioned that 
the increased training activity does not necessarily lead to more profits or a rise in 
productivity. But as policy makers and researchers stress the current and future 
need for trained workforces it is important to know that workplace representation 
indeed has positive effects on firm-provided training.  
However, my results show that there are nonetheless general positive effects espe-
cially of works councils on firm-provided training even after taking unobserved fac-
tors into account. The bivariate probit model documented a negative relationship 
between works councils and further training that is outweighed by a stronger positive 
effect. In particular regarding the existence of works councils there is a positive im-IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2010  21 
pact on the further training activity and on the training intensity. On the other hand 
there is also strong evidence of a positive relationship between shop-floor participa-
tion and both training activity and intensity. Moreover, the IV analysis brings forward 
new evidence that the findings regarding works councils even hold in the presence 
of unobserved factors. However, as it was not possible to extend the IV analyses to 
the mechanism of shop-floor participation, one should be wary of causal statements 
regarding shop-floor participation and it remains an open question how to cope with 
its potential endogeneity. 
It is a stylized fact about workplace training that larger firms typically train more than 
smaller firms do. The manifold reasons why this is the case include for example: 
collecting information and organizing training lead to fixed costs and economies of 
scale favouring larger firms. Another reason for the lower training effort in smaller 
firms is that higher monitoring costs in larger firms should also lead to stronger train-
ing activity. Against this background it is important to know that some determinants 
of training and their effects or relationships differ in terms of strength according to 
firm size. The presented results of this study reveal new evidence that this is the 
case with workplace representation. As for shop-floor participation a stronger further 
training activity and intensity is observed among smaller establishments. Further-
more, while the results of the linear IV estimation cannot detect any significant firm-
size differentials, the bivariate probit suggests a stronger impact of works councils 
among SMEs regarding further training activity. 
All in all these results emphasize that the (empirical) assessment of workplace rep-
resentation is incomplete if training effects are not taken into account. It should also 
be emphasized that it is not necessarily the direct rights and responsibilities that will 
boost a firms’ training effort. So the results suggest providing more incentives to 
establish mechanisms of employer-employee relations and making these positive 
effects (and explanations of these effects) more publically known. 
   IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2010  22 
Endnotes 
 
1 Niedenhoff (2005) offers a comprehensive description of the German system of co-
determination and the rights and responsibilities of the works council. 
2 Institute for Employment Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB) of 
the German Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, BA)) 
3 The questionnaires are available in English online: 
http://www.fdz.iab.de/en/FDZ_Establishment_Data/IAB_Establishment_Panel_Working_Tool
s.aspx 
4 The IAB Establishment Panel leaves it to the respondent to decide whether to report the 
number of employees trained or the number of cases of participation in training. To avoid a 
selection bias I convert the number of cases of participation into the number of employees 
trained following the procedure used by Düll & Bellmann (1998). 
5 Implementing an IV approach for count data models is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Therefore I stay with Angrist (1991:24): “Linear IV estimation of average treatment effects in 
nonlinear models can often be justified.” IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2010  23 
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Appendix 
Table A1 
Variables capturing dynamics of workplace representation 
Existence of workplace 
representation in year …  Dummy variables set 
t1  t2  t3  Introduction  Closure  Always  Never 
0  0  0  0  0  0  1 
0  0  1  1  0  0  0 
0  1  1  1  0  0  0 
1  1  1  0  0  1  0 
1  1  0  0  1  0  0 
1  0  0  0  1  0  0 
0  1  0  0  1  0  0 
1  0  1  1  0  0  0 
Note: The conclusions derived from tables 7 and 8 hold also if establishments with multiple changes 
(last two lines) are excluded from the analysis. Example: In the second line I observe the introduction 




Variable  Logit I  ZINB I 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Training activity (d)  0.680  0.463     
Number of workers trained      36.95  218.49 
10-49 employees (d)  0.393  0.488  0.397  0.489 
50-99 employees (d)  0.126  0.332  0.127  0.332 
100-249 employees (d)  0.125  0.331  0.124  0.330 
250-499 employees (d)  0.0650  0.247  0.0635  0.244 
500-999 employees  0.0340  0.181  0.0325  0.178 
1000 + employees (d)  0.0253  0.157  0.0227  0.149 
Region (d, 1 = western Germany)  0.622  0.485  0.619  0.486 
Skilled workers (p)  0.696  0.254  0.696  0.255 
Fixed-term contract workers (p)  0.0491  0.117  0.0490  0.117 
Part-time workers (p)  0.174  0.210  0.174  0.220 
Labour turnover*  0.103  0.205  0.103  0.206 
Technology (five-point scale, 1 = new, 5 = old)  2.147  0.754  2.148  0.754 
IT investments (d)  0.537  0.499  0.534  0.499 
Investments in production facilities (d)  0.528  0.499  0.525  0.499 
Type of establishment (d, 1 = single firm establishment)  0.269  0.444  0.266  0.442 
Last year’s profitability (five-point scale, 1 = very good, 5 
= very poor)  2.865  1.057  2.867  1.0571 
Shop-floor participation (d)  0.0881  0.284  0.0877  0.283 
Works council (d)  0.315  0.464  0.309  0.462 
Collective agreement (d)   0.508  0.500  0.505  0.500 
Industry dummies, year dummies  included 
d = dummy (1 = true if not indicated otherwise), p = proportion; * hires+layoffs/0.5*(number of employ-
ees+(number of employees – hires+layoffs)); Source: IAB Establishment Panel (2003-2007). 
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Interpretation of the ZINB model 
Training intensity is the proportion of workers trained  . This proportion is computed 
from the number of workers trained   and the total number of workers in the estab-
lishment  : 
 
Count data models can be interpreted as a proportion (Long & Freese 2006) by in-
cluding the logarithm of the number of employees as a regressor with a coefficient 
restricted to one  . This results from the ZINB model 
. 
From this it follows that 
. 
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Table A3 
Logit model I 
Dependent variable: training activity 
  All estab‘s  SMEs 
Large es-
tab‘s. 
10-49 employees  0.428***  0.463***  0.270* 
  (0.0535)  (0.0575)  (0.157) 
50-99 employees  0.885***  0.941***  0.705*** 
  (0.0831)  (0.0954)  (0.191) 
100-249 employees  1.406***  1.474***  1.211*** 
  (0.109)  (0.133)  (0.215) 
250-499 employees  2.095***    1.821*** 
  (0.175)    (0.286) 
500-999 employees  2.454***    2.137*** 
  (0.305)    (0.381) 
1000 + employees  3.211***    2.793*** 
  (0.506)    (0.556) 
Region  -0.105**  -0.114**  -0.0697 
  (0.0507)  (0.0562)  (0.116) 
Skilled workers  1.011***  1.036***  0.961*** 
  (0.0967)  (0.111)  (0.200) 
Fixed-term contract workers  -0.213  -0.0594  -0.605 
  (0.198)  (0.227)  (0.402) 
Part-time workers  -0.498***  -0.505***  -0.317 
  (0.115)  (0.132)  (0.239) 
Labour turnover  -0.345***  -0.453***  -0.0534 
  (0.107)  (0.132)  (0.177) 
Technology  -0.237***  -0.257***  -0.162** 
  (0.0297)  (0.0332)  (0.0652) 
IT investments  0.647***  0.607***  0.834*** 
  (0.0476)  (0.0527)  (0.114) 
Investments in production facilities  0.434***  0.428***  0.451*** 
  (0.0489)  (0.0538)  (0.120) 
Type of establishment  0.467***    0.539** 
  (0.0633)    (0.267) 
Last year’s profitability  -0.0571***  -0.0566**  -0.0488 
  (0.0212)  (0.0237)  (0.0493) 
Shop-floor participation  0.481***  0.490***  0.459** 
  (0.0848)  (0.0962)  (0.183) 
Works council  0.375***  0.302***  0.482*** 
  (0.0781)  (0.0993)  (0.127) 
Collective agreement  0.339***  0.308***  0.450*** 
  (0.0501)  (0.0559)  (0.117) 
Constant  -0.801***  -0.818***  -0.870** 
  (0.146)  (0.164)  (0.444) 
Observations  15,113  10,229  4,884 
Pseudo-R
2  0.2324  0.1735  0.2228 
SMEs
 = small and medium-sized establishments; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1; industry and year dummies included. Source: IAB Establishment Panel (2003-2007). 
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Table A4  
ZINB model I 














10-49 employees  -0.211***  -0.0147  -0.170***  -0.0678  -0.284***  0.569 
  (0.0274)  (0.0812)  (0.0312)  (0.0846)  (0.0644)  (0.348) 
50-99 employees  -0.416***  -0.150  -0.377***  -0.244*  -0.421***  0.442 
  (0.0402)  (0.114)  (0.0508)  (0.125)  (0.0754)  (0.379) 
100-249 employees  -0.468***  -0.539***  -0.373***  -0.672***  -0.547***  0.128 
  (0.0440)  (0.143)  (0.0598)  (0.165)  (0.0757)  (0.404) 
250-499 employees  -0.543***  -1.164***      -0.631***  -0.392 
  (0.0543)  (0.217)      (0.0829)  (0.478) 
500-999 employees  -0.534***  -1.382***      -0.625***  -0.549 
  (0.0687)  (0.343)      (0.0911)  (0.537) 
1000 + employees  -0.396***  -2.109***      -0.524***  -1.183 
  (0.0704)  (0.583)      (0.0938)  (0.744) 
Region  -0.175***  0.00587  -0.197***  0.000983  -0.180***  0.0375 
  (0.0241)  (0.0717)  (0.0293)  (0.0773)  (0.0399)  (0.175) 
Skilled workers  0.532***  -1.078***  0.485***  -1.091***  0.581***  -1.019*** 
  (0.0595)  (0.139)  (0.0796)  (0.157)  (0.0858)  (0.301) 
Fixed-term contract workers  0.0698  0.300  0.114  0.147  -0.0445  0.988 
  (0.153)  (0.269)  (0.180)  (0.300)  (0.210)  (0.681) 
Part-time workers  0.0634  0.699***  0.0901  0.695***  0.103  0.535 
  (0.0630)  (0.160)  (0.0744)  (0.179)  (0.105)  (0.348) 
Labour turnover  -0.196**  0.337**  -0.128  0.495***  -0.306**  -0.617 
  (0.0789)  (0.147)  (0.0910)  (0.177)  (0.125)  (0.655) 
Technology  -0.0915***  0.269***  -0.108***  0.277***  -0.0685***  0.149 
  (0.0152)  (0.0431)  (0.0191)  (0.0470)  (0.0240)  (0.0968) 
IT investments  0.0994***  -0.848***  0.115***  -0.743***  0.0653  -1.212*** 
  (0.0254)  (0.0721)  (0.0307)  (0.0774)  (0.0433)  (0.180) 
Investments in production facilities  0.0334  -0.540***  0.00641  -0.533***  0.0861**  -0.590*** 
  (0.0254)  (0.0730)  (0.0304)  (0.0788)  (0.0430)  (0.188) 
Type of establishment  0.191***  -0.538***      0.234***  -0.604* 
  (0.0249)  (0.0905)      (0.0541)  (0.324) 
Last year’s profitability  -0.0150  0.0631**  -0.0142  0.0504  -0.0168  0.114 
  (0.0103)  (0.0305)  (0.0131)  (0.0334)  (0.0164)  (0.0738) 
Shop-floor participation  0.0822**  -0.605***  0.125***  -0.580***  0.0520  -0.610** 
  (0.0329)  (0.131)  (0.0438)  (0.142)  (0.0489)  (0.293) 
Works council  0.0386  -0.387***  -0.0169  -0.266**  0.100**  -0.633*** 
  (0.0328)  (0.113)  (0.0456)  (0.132)  (0.0481)  (0.210) 
Collective agreement  0.0286  -0.411***  0.0618**  -0.334***  -0.0327  -0.607*** 
  (0.0259)  (0.0728)  (0.0308)  (0.0786)  (0.0460)  (0.184) 
Constant  -1.341***  0.0920  -1.348***  0.171  -1.342***  -0.209 
  (0.0754)  (0.207)  (0.0981)  (0.225)  (0.137)  (0.684) 
ln(alpha)  -0.198***  -0.286***  -0.160*** 
  (0.0244)  (0.0408)  (0.0301) 
Observations  14909  10178  4731 
Wald-   896.00  615.34  460.62 
SMEs
 = small and medium-sized establishments; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
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Table A5 
Logit model II 
Dependent variable: training activity 
  All estab’s  SMEs  Large estab’s 
10-49 employees  0.424***  0.446***  0.340* 
  (0.0588)  (0.0629)  (0.176) 
50-99 employees  0.865***  0.886***  0.797*** 
  (0.0948)  (0.107)  (0.226) 
100-249 employees  1.384***  1.479***  1.181*** 
  (0.124)  (0.152)  (0.244) 
250-499 employees  2.028***    1.734*** 
  (0.206)    (0.328) 
500-999 employees  2.382***    2.031*** 
  (0.372)    (0.456) 
1000 + employees  2.795***    2.373*** 
  (0.507)    (0.578) 
Region  -0.145**  -0.146**  -0.152 
  (0.0568)  (0.0624)  (0.135) 
Skilled workers  1.005***  1.036***  0.942*** 
  (0.110)  (0.125)  (0.236) 
Fixed-term contract workers  -0.255  -0.0649  -0.846* 
  (0.226)  (0.254)  (0.470) 
Part-time workers  -0.503***  -0.531***  -0.300 
  (0.128)  (0.145)  (0.277) 
Labour turnover  -0.297**  -0.414***  -0.0116 
  (0.118)  (0.144)  (0.219) 
Technology  -0.258***  -0.276***  -0.187** 
  (0.0333)  (0.0371)  (0.0754) 
IT investments  0.659***  0.610***  0.912*** 
  (0.0530)  (0.0582)  (0.131) 
Investments in production facilities  0.442***  0.446***  0.397*** 
  (0.0547)  (0.0597)  (0.140) 
Type of establishment  0.495***    0.464 
  (0.0725)    (0.314) 
Last years profitability  -0.0640***  -0.0651**  -0.0524 
  (0.0237)  (0.0262)  (0.0576) 
Introduction woco  -0.168  -0.201  -0.0308 
  (0.156)  (0.218)  (0.238) 
Closure woco  0.0455  0.215  -0.167 
  (0.162)  (0.215)  (0.253) 
Always woco  0.522***  0.446***  0.605*** 
  (0.0966)  (0.122)  (0.159) 
Introduction sfp  0.695***  0.648***  0.912*** 
  (0.116)  (0.130)  (0.276) 
Closure sfp  0.275***  0.347***  0.0147 
  (0.0935)  (0.104)  (0.212) 
Cont´d       
Always sfp  0.444**  0.442*  0.293 
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Collective agreement  0.332***  0.305***  0.448*** 
  (0.0557)  (0.0616)  (0.137) 
Constant  -0.806***  -0.826***  -0.747 
  (0.163)  (0.182)  (0.513) 
Observations  12042  8377  3665 
Pseudo R
2  0.2340  0.1753  0.2268 
SMEs
 = small and medium-sized establishments; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1; industry and year dummies included. Source: IAB Establishment Panel (2003-2007). 
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Table A6  
ZINB model II 














10-49 employees  -0.206***  -0.00691  -0.157***  -0.0307  -0.332***  0.422 
  (0.0302)  (0.0881)  (0.0342)  (0.0918)  (0.0732)  (0.388) 
50-99 employees  -0.429***  -0.128  -0.388***  -0.164  -0.491***  0.228 
  (0.0462)  (0.128)  (0.0579)  (0.139)  (0.0869)  (0.433) 
100-249 employees  -0.498***  -0.521***  -0.407***  -0.665***  -0.625***  0.107 
  (0.0507)  (0.162)  (0.0690)  (0.187)  (0.0863)  (0.449) 
250-499 employees  -0.589***  -1.099***      -0.724***  -0.374 
  (0.0631)  (0.251)      (0.0952)  (0.529) 
500-999 employees  -0.567***  -1.305***      -0.699***  -0.488 
  (0.0810)  (0.419)      (0.106)  (0.616) 
1000 + employees  -0.430***  -1.658***      -0.584***  -0.725 
  (0.0817)  (0.568)      (0.109)  (0.773) 
Region  -0.218***  0.0427  -0.239***  0.0284  -0.218***  0.108 
  (0.0273)  (0.0810)  (0.0328)  (0.0864)  (0.0466)  (0.221) 
Skilled workers  0.516***  -1.042***  0.456***  -1.070***  0.587***  -0.938** 
  (0.0678)  (0.160)  (0.0899)  (0.180)  (0.0988)  (0.367) 
Fixed-term contract workers  0.265  0.442  0.294  0.231  0.232  1.904** 
  (0.181)  (0.303)  (0.216)  (0.331)  (0.239)  (0.838) 
Part-time workers  0.0928  0.784***  0.0918  0.789***  0.177  0.627 
  (0.0703)  (0.180)  (0.0822)  (0.199)  (0.123)  (0.424) 
Labour turnover  -0.211**  0.290*  -0.169*  0.447**  -0.332**  -1.507 
  (0.0899)  (0.163)  (0.0998)  (0.194)  (0.131)  (0.950) 
Technology  -0.0974***  0.290***  -0.109***  0.301***  -0.0763***  0.143 
  (0.0171)  (0.0489)  (0.0216)  (0.0532)  (0.0274)  (0.119) 
IT investments  0.0991***  -0.851***  0.131***  -0.735***  0.0260  -1.251*** 
  (0.0289)  (0.0802)  (0.0344)  (0.0851)  (0.0505)  (0.215) 
Investments in production facilities  0.0447  -0.560***  0.00854  -0.568***  0.138***  -0.546** 
  (0.0288)  (0.0825)  (0.0339)  (0.0879)  (0.0511)  (0.218) 
Type of establishment  0.177***  -0.574***      0.219***  -0.509 
  (0.0284)  (0.104)      (0.0638)  (0.377) 
Last year’s profitability  -0.0222*  0.0608*  -0.0150  0.0571  -0.0352*  0.0870 
  (0.0115)  (0.0340)  (0.0145)  (0.0368)  (0.0188)  (0.0885) 
Introduction woco  0.0143  0.234  0.0911  0.342  -0.0259  -0.111 
  (0.0708)  (0.212)  (0.112)  (0.268)  (0.0930)  (0.380) 
Closure woco  -0.0713  -0.158  -0.0490  -0.323  -0.0462  0.0477 
  (0.0755)  (0.256)  (0.103)  (0.326)  (0.115)  (0.457) 
Always woco  0.0892**  -0.547***  0.0427  -0.442***  0.129**  -0.705*** 
  (0.0396)  (0.138)  (0.0552)  (0.161)  (0.0599)  (0.255) 
Introduction sfp  0.120***  -0.967***  0.161***  -0.846***  0.0809  -0.979** 
  (0.0444)  (0.214)  (0.0571)  (0.226)  (0.0696)  (0.470) 
Closure sfp  0.0372  -0.353**  0.0197  -0.406***  0.0822  -0.179 
  (0.0403)  (0.138)  (0.0520)  (0.149)  (0.0647)  (0.327) 
Always sfp  0.128  -0.588*  0.207**  -0.501  0.00172  -0.564 
  (0.0811)  (0.324)  (0.105)  (0.331)  (0.124)  (0.985) 
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Collective agreement  0.0490*  -0.380***  0.0869**  -0.301***  -0.0360  -0.680*** 
  (0.0294)  (0.0806)  (0.0345)  (0.0857)  (0.0543)  (0.226) 
Constant  -1.318***  0.111  -1.345***  0.147  -1.241***  -0.0931 
  (0.0851)  (0.229)  (0.109)  (0.252)  (0.155)  (0.736) 
ln(alpha)  -0.212***  -0.299***  -0.173*** 
  (0.0282)  (0.0470)  (0.0353) 
Observations  11910  8343  3567 
Wald-   790.62  540.61  403.69 
SMEs
 = small and medium-sized establishments; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1; industry and year dummies included. Source: IAB Establishment Panel (2003-2007). 
 
Table A7 
Bivariate probit model 














10-49 employees  0.253***  0.753***  0.261***  1.036***  0.249***  0.374*** 
  (0.0300)  (0.0584)  (0.0324)  (0.0973)  (0.0877)  (0.0983) 
50-99 employees  0.501***  1.610***  0.507***  2.036***  0.513***  0.918*** 
  (0.0514)  (0.0657)  (0.0627)  (0.103)  (0.110)  (0.110) 
100-249 employees  0.692***  2.244***  0.694***  2.826***  0.710***  1.352*** 
  (0.0695)  (0.0686)  (0.0937)  (0.106)  (0.127)  (0.111) 
250-499 employees  0.952***  2.637***      0.977***  1.786*** 
  (0.0926)  (0.0843)      (0.150)  (0.121) 
500-999 employees  1.200***  2.946***      1.223***  2.081*** 
  (0.123)  (0.117)      (0.170)  (0.144) 
1000 + employees  1.326***  3.138***      1.316***  2.303*** 
  (0.158)  (0.148)      (0.197)  (0.167) 
Region  -0.0804***  0.0328  -0.0841***  0.0578  -0.0818  0.0702 
  (0.0268)  (0.0424)  (0.0306)  (0.0561)  (0.0556)  (0.0645) 
Skilled workers  0.564***  0.803***  0.566***  0.792***  0.605***  0.718*** 
  (0.0500)  (0.0703)  (0.0588)  (0.0981)  (0.0963)  (0.0973) 
Fixed-term contract workers  -0.0620  0.137  -0.00629  -0.0832  -0.224  0.141 
  (0.104)  (0.164)  (0.122)  (0.212)  (0.197)  (0.255) 
Part-time workers  -0.314***  -0.111  -0.307***  -0.556***  -0.217*  0.148 
  (0.0609)  (0.0874)  (0.0731)  (0.130)  (0.114)  (0.124) 
Technology  -0.145***  0.156***  -0.168***  0.217***  -0.0720**  0.0757** 
  (0.0153)  (0.0210)  (0.0176)  (0.0282)  (0.0301)  (0.0320) 
IT investments  0.377***  0.107***  0.358***  0.187***  0.430***  -0.00253 
  (0.0245)  (0.0329)  (0.0276)  (0.0436)  (0.0538)  (0.0532) 
Investments in production facilities  0.244***  0.101***  0.238***  0.138***  0.257***  0.0469 
  (0.0254)  (0.0317)  (0.0282)  (0.0418)  (0.0574)  (0.0518) 
Type of establishment  0.225***  0.657***      0.257***  0.156* 
  (0.0345)  (0.0368)      (0.0975)  (0.0889) 
Last year’s profitability  -0.0473***  0.0399***  -0.0377***  0.0615***  -0.0743***  0.0248 
  (0.0107)  (0.0135)  (0.0122)  (0.0179)  (0.0222)  (0.0214) 
Collective agreement  0.149***  0.890***  0.135***  0.801***  0.213***  1.037*** 
  (0.0278)  (0.0346)  (0.0310)  (0.0455)  (0.0652)  (0.0537) 
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Labour turnover  -0.259***  -1.091***  -0.283***  -1.043***  -0.140  -1.055*** 
  (0.0582)  (0.132)  (0.0701)  (0.200)  (0.0931)  (0.177) 
Works council  0.473***    0.516***    0.305*   
  (0.0863)    (0.112)    (0.157)   
Age dummy    0.0883**    0.0766    0.130** 
    (0.0386)    (0.0513)    (0.0580) 
Constant  -0.453***  -3.261***  -0.460***  -3.849***  -0.462**  -1.922*** 
  (0.0755)  (0.116)  (0.0863)  (0.174)  (0.195)  (0.198) 
Rho  -0.179***  -0.229***  -0.0470 
Wald-   8107.15  4401.39  2334.26 
Observations  20547  13745  6802 
SMEs
 = small and medium-sized establishments; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1; industry and year dummies included. Source: IAB Establishment Panel (2003-2007). 
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Table A8 
Linear instrumental variable model 
Dependent variable: training intensity 
  All estab’s  Large estab’s  SMEs 
10-49 employees  -0.0388***  -0.0939***  -0.0250*** 
  (0.00616)  (0.0201)  (0.00639) 
50-99 employees  -0.0794***  -0.113***  -0.0612*** 
  (0.0122)  (0.0259)  (0.0143) 
100-249 employees  -0.112***  -0.142***  -0.0854*** 
  (0.0176)  (0.0300)  (0.0227) 
250-499 employees  -0.130***  -0.159***   
  (0.0209)  (0.0341)   
500-999 employees  -0.124***  -0.151***   
  (0.0233)  (0.0357)   
1000 + employees  -0.120***  -0.153***   
  (0.0240)  (0.0365)   
Region  -0.0434***  -0.0516***  -0.0429*** 
  (0.00486)  (0.00942)  (0.00554) 
Skilled workers  0.114***  0.158***  0.0973*** 
  (0.00952)  (0.0186)  (0.0105) 
Fixed-term contract workers  0.00113  -0.00798  0.00374 
  (0.0214)  (0.0383)  (0.0234) 
Part-time workers  -0.0114  0.0169  -0.0145 
  (0.0114)  (0.0217)  (0.0133) 
Technology  -0.0356***  -0.0305***  -0.0358*** 
  (0.00278)  (0.00524)  (0.00322) 
IT investments  0.0503***  0.0427***  0.0527*** 
  (0.00469)  (0.00914)  (0.00539) 
Investments in production facilities  0.0204***  0.0224**  0.0204*** 
  (0.00462)  (0.00917)  (0.00525) 
Type of establishment  0.0522***  0.0491***   
  (0.00670)  (0.0110)   
Last year’s profitability  -0.00843***  -0.0115***  -0.00604*** 
  (0.00186)  (0.00330)  (0.00224) 
Collective agreement  0.0137**  0.0203  0.0174*** 
  (0.00662)  (0.0172)  (0.00655) 
Labour turnover  -0.0304***  -0.0192  -0.0408*** 
  (0.00943)  (0.0200)  (0.0103) 
Works council  0.0847***  0.0301  0.0677** 
  (0.0289)  (0.0506)  (0.0341) 
Constant  0.208***  0.281***  0.189*** 
  (0.0138)  (0.0309)  (0.0159) 
Observations  21363  6972  14391 
R
2  0.130  0.114  0.133 
SMEs
 = small and medium-sized establishments; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1; industry and year dummies included. Source: IAB Establishment Panel (2003-2007). IAB-Discussion Paper 14/2010  36 
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